



THE LIFE OF WILL

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LA VIDA DE LA VOLUNTAD

Resumen: Mi trabajo pretende bosquejar una parte de las raíces de la *Krisis*. Me gustaría mostrar si hay realmente una continuidad en la definición de razón práctica y lógica entre los primeros y los últimos trabajos de Husserl. En la *Krisis*, Husserl delimita un significado de razón que se aleja de lo explicado en sus primeros escritos éticos y lógicos. Así, para lograr mi objetivo, enfocaré la definición de razón práctica y lógica en los cursos sobre ética de 1914 y en los estudios genéticos de 1920. Usaré estos dos trabajos porque creo que, con la introducción del método genético y el desarrollo del análisis ético, la pregunta por la razón es mejorada, además de modificarse la relación entre razón lógica y práctica. Atendiendo a los escritos de Husserl, creo que “la vida” de la voluntad o la estructura de la razón práctica devienen el corazón de toda actividad de la razón.

Palabras Clave: Husserl, fenomenología, interés, atención, voluntad.

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Abstract: With my work I would like to sketch out a part of the roots of Husserlian *Krisis*. I would like to show if there is really a continuity in the definition of practical and logical reason worked out by Husserl between his first and latest works. Indeed, in *Krisis* Husserl marks out a meaning of reason which is far from that elaborated in his first ethical and logical writings. Thus, to attend my purpose, I will focus on the definition of practical and logical reason as they come out in ethical lectures of 1914 and genetic studies of 1920. I will use these two works, because I believe that through the introduction of the genetic method and the development of the ethical analysis, the inquiry on reason is improved and also the relationship between logical and practical reason has been modified. Following Husserlian writings, I believe that the “life” of will or the structure of practical reason becomes the core of every activity of reason over the years.

Keywords: Husserl, phenomenology, interest, attention, will.

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INTRODUCTION

Der Zusammenbruch des Glaubens an eine universale Philosophie als Führerin des neuen Menschen besagt (...) den Zusammenbruch des Glaubens an die "Vernunft", so verstanden, wie die Alten die Episteme der *Doxa* gegenüber setzen. Sie ist es, die allem vermeintlich Seienden, allen Dingen, Werten, Zwecken letztlich Sinn gibt, nämlich ihre normative Bezogenheit auf das, was seit den Anfängen der Philosophie das Wort Wahrheit –Wahrheit an sich– und korrelativ das Wort Seiendes –'ὄντως ὄν'– bezeichnet. Damit fällt auch der Glaube an eine 'absolute' Vernunft, aus der die Welt ihren Sinn hat (...). Verliert der Mensch diesen Glaube, so (...) er verliert den Glauben "an sich selbst".¹

The reason can be considered as one of the most important subjects of Husserlian phenomenological research. In this excerpt of *Krisis*, the reason is described as an "instrument of sense", i. e. as a source of meaning that can give sense to the surrounding world and to the man. As the author writes, in the "skeptical deluge" only the faith in a science founded on the reason can save our truth, our possibility to know and to build our identity. But, comparing these words with those of the ethical writings of 1914², we can see how much Husserlian idea of reason and, consequently of science have been modified.

Through this paper, we would like to show if there is really a continuity in the

1. HUSSERL, E.: *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, hrsg. von Walter Biemel. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954, p. 42.

2. Cf. HUSSERL, E.: *Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre*, 1908 - 1914, hrsg. von Ulrich Melle. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988, p. 56. (Hereafter cited as Hua XXVIII): "Alle Vernunft ist nur eine, nämlich logische Vernunft ist, und dass somit praktische Vernunft und axiologische überhaupt nur ein besonderes Anwendungsgebiet der logischen sind".

definition of practical and logical reason elaborated by Husserl during these years. To attend this aim, we will focus on the meaning of will as it comes out in his ethical work elaborated in 1914³ and his genetic studies of 1920.⁴ We will use these two groups of researches because we believe that through the introduction of the genetic method and the development of ethical analysis the enquiry of reason is improved and also the relationship between logical and practical reason is modified.

1. THE PARALLELISM OF REASON

One of the first analytical descriptions of the practical reason can be found in the ethical lectures of 1914.⁵ These ethical lectures, as Melle remarked in his introduction to the volume of *Husserliana* XXVIII, are the systematical result of ethical researches carried out by Husserl from 1902.⁶ In these lectures the practical reason is identified above all with the will. The aim of the analysis of will is the realization of the ethical project, which consists in the foundation of an ethical science. The ethical project is thought within the structure of parallelism. The parallelism represents, in general, the structure in which the ethical project is articulated.

Traditionell werden Wahrheit, Gute und Schönheit als koordinierte philosophischen Ideen hingestellt und ihnen entsprechende parallele normative philosophische Disziplinen angenommen: Logik, Ethik, Aesthetic. Diese Parallelisierung hat ihre tiefliegenden und nicht hinreichend geklärten Motive, sie birgt in sich große philosophische Probleme, denen wir in der Interesse einer wissenschaftlichen Begründung der Ethik [...] nachgehen wollen.⁷

In the ethical project we cannot find a traditional kind of ethics. We are agree with

3.The first description of the ethical project elaborated by Husserl is around 1902 in *Vorlesungen über Grundfragen zur Ethik und Wertlehre* and it is developed systematically on three occasion: in *Vorlesungen über Ethik* of 1908-09, 1911 and 1914. About the genesis of this project is possible to look up Letter of Husserl to Meinong the April 5 1902 (*Briefwechsel*, hrsg. von Karl Schuhmann. The Hague; Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, Bd. I, p. 145), Idee I, footnote 1, p. 219 and HUSSERL, E.: *Formale und transzendente Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*, hrsg. von Paul Janssen. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, footnote 1, p. 142.

4.We will refer above all to: HUSSERL, E.: *Aktive Synthesen: Aus der Vorlesung "Transzendente Logik" 1920/21* *Ergänzungsband zu "Analysen zur passiven Synthesis"*, hrsg. von Roland Breuer. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, pp. 9-10, (hereafter cited as Hua XXXI).

5.The most important volumes of *Husserliana* published about this project are volumes XXVIII and XXXVII.

6.MELLE, U.: *Introduction to Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre, 1908 - 1914*, hrsg. von Ulrich Melle. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988, p. XXIII, (hereafter cited as Hua XXVIII).

7.Hua XXVIII, p. 3.

what Nenon wrote about Husserlian ethics: "It is not a traditional form of ethics, but above all a theoretical analysis of it".⁸ Indeed Husserlian ethical project consists in the foundation of an ethical science and its realization is strictly connected to the logical project. The ethical project consists in the enquiry of the idea of good, that the "philosophical tradition" posed on the same stage of the idea of truth. Thanks to the model of philosophical tradition, Husserl seeks to found an ethical science through the analysis of the idea of good and its rational fundament. In substance, Husserl wants to become an "Aristoteles der reinen Ethik"⁹, making ethics a science analogous with logic. But he wants to avoid to fall in the same error of Aristotle, that is leaving out the idea of good in virtue of that of truth. Following the philosopher, it is necessary to go through both terms of parallelism, in order to recognize the rational fundament of a possible ethical science. The ideas of truth and good are possible fundaments of normative disciplines because these ideas are the correlatives objects of modes (*Arten*) of a rational consciousness.

Nevertheless in this work Husserl falls in a contradiction, because he writes that: "Alle Vernunft ist nur eine, nämlich logische Vernunft ist, und dass somit praktische Vernunft (...) nur ein besonderes Anwendungsgebiet der logischen sind".¹⁰ While, in these lines Husserl describes the rationality of consciousness as a logical rationality, in his project, proposed in the same lectures, the rationality of consciousness is explained as a rational core of many different kinds of reason. He said in fact that it is possible a parallelism between the logical and the practical reason of consciousness and respectively "nach der Parallelen der Akt- und Vernunftarten auf welche diese Disziplinen wesentlich zurückbezogen sind".¹¹ If we go through the structure of parallelism of consciousness, we can see that it is described in this way:

Geht man nun den Parallelen von Logik und Ethik nach bzw. der Parallele der Akt- und Vernunftarten, auf welche diese Disziplinen wesentlich zurückbezogen sind, der urteilende Vernunft auf der einen Seite, der praktischen Vernunft auf der anderen, so drängt sich der Gedanke auf, dass nun auch Logik in dem bestimmt und eng Sinn einer formal Logik als Parallele entsprechen muss eine in analogem Sinn formale und ebenfalls apriorische Praktik (...) Sowie Zeit übrig bleibt, soll dann auf die großen Problemgruppen der Phänomenologie und Kritik der Vernunft eingegangen werden, die sich nach diesen radikalen formalen Disziplinen orientieren.¹²

8.NENON, T.: *Willing and Acting in Husserl's Lectures on Ethics and Values Theory*. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.

9.HUSSERL, E.: *Einleitung in die Ethik 1920-1924*, hrsg. von Hennig Peucker. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, p. 31, (from now on shorten with Hua XXXVII).

10.Hua XXVIII, p. 56.

11.*Ivi*, p. 3.

12.HUSSERL, E.: *Aufsätze und Vorträge(1911-1921)*, hrsg. von Thomas Nenon und Hans

Namely, in this excerpt consciousness is not only a logical consciousness, but it is a rational unity composed by logical and practical reason. These forms of reason are the rational fundament of the ideas of truth and good and correspond to the skill of consciousness of knowing and of willing. Consciousness is a rational unity that changes its structure following its object of interest (it can be a logical, practical or axiological consciousness).

The definition of will is parallel to the definition of logical reason elaborated by Husserl in his ethical and logical researches. In the ethical lectures of 1914 Husserl introduces the definition of will through the symmetrical parallelism between logical and practical reason.

This parallelism represents the structure which is at the basis of the interaction between consciousness and world: every position (*Setzung*) of consciousness has some correspondences into a specific kind of reason. If the consciousness knows the reality, it uses the logical reason, if it values it, it uses the axiological reason, if it perceives it, it uses the aesthetical reason and so on. All of these forms of reason are parallel each others and their balance in the mundane application is possible just thanks to the structure of parallelism which keeps them at the same time together and separated.

This different modes of reason are, as well, the rational fundament of many scientific disciplines: the logical reason is the rational fundament of logical science and at the same way the practical reason should be the rational fundament of the ethical science. Then the practical reason defined by Husserl as a rational willing, is the rational fundament of an ethical science and this last is parallel to the logical science and to its rational fundament.¹³

We think that Husserl falls in a contradiction about his definition of the rationality of consciousness, because in the ethical lectures of 1914 he is still deeply linked to the work of *Logische Untersuchungen*.¹⁴ He wants to found an ethical science which is as pure and universal as the logic described in his logical investigations. But it is necessary to stress that in this set the parallelism between logical and practical reason is not so symmetrical. If the logical reason is, as he wrote, the reason of *Wissenschaftslehre*¹⁵, it does not leave room for a pure practical reason.

Rainer Sepp. The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987, p. 197.

13. See: Hua XXVIII, pp. 3-11; pp. 102-140.

14. See: Hua XXVIII, p. 3: "Im wesentlichen haben wir dabei kurz an die Ausführungen zu erinnern, die ich schon in ersten Band meiner Logische Untersuchungen, in die Prolegomena zur reinen Logik gegeben (...) habe".

15. HUSSERL, E.: *Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Text der 1. und der 2. Auflage*. Halle: 1900, rev. Ed. 1913, hrsg. von Elmar Holstein. The Hague: Martinus, § 5, (hereafter cited as XVIII).

Indeed, in the ethical lectures of 1914 the logical reason is considered a more important reason than the ethical one. Husserl defined it as a reason with “*Allwirksamkeit*”¹⁶ and he described practical reason as a servant of logical reason everywhere.¹⁷

2. THE DEFINITION OF WILL IN 1914

In his *Husserls Phänomenologie des Willens*, Melle¹⁸ shows the main subjects of Husserlian analysis of will¹⁹ and he describes also the philosophical influences that affected Husserl in the progression of his work. Namely, he refers to the work of James²⁰ and Ehrenfels.²¹ According to the first philosopher the main characteristic of will is the attention and its *fiat*, that is the “act of mental consent”. For Ehrenfels the act of will cannot be a founding act, because it is just a pretension (*Forderung*) of something and thus it needs the representative acts of logical reason.

The description of will of 1914 is under these influences. It is considered as a parallel modalization of consciousness. It represents that capacity of consciousness of willing or doing something. It is described as a logical act that belongs to the realm of operating. Its distinctive characteristic is that of “*fiat!*” or in German “*es werde!*”.²² The consciousness of will is a creative consciousness. It pronounces its creative *fiat* and, thanks to this, a new form of reality is created. The thesis of will (*Willensthesis*) is a position of realization and creation.

It can be thought also as a specific kind of reason that assumes different characteristics according to the way of being of consciousness. As it was for judgments, for volitions too there are different kinds of expression.

“Für alle Abwandlungen des Urteilsbewußtseins finden wir so und *apriori* parallele Abwandlungen des Willensbewußtseins”.²³

It is possible, in fact, that we can want something with conviction or doubt, with desire or fear or with many more expressions. And these correspond to the different

16.Hua XXVIII, p. 58.

17.See: *Ivi*, pp. 61-65.

18.MELLE, U.: *Husserls Phänomenologie des Willens*, *Tijdschrift voor filosofie*, vol 54, num. 2, pp. 280-305.

19.The subjects are: Die Fundierung des Willens, Die Arten des Willens, “Die Willenobjektivitäten, das Verhältnis von Wille und Tendenz”. In our work we will focus above all on the second and the last subject.

20.JAMES, W.: *Principles of Mental Psychology*, vol. 1. New York: Dover Publications, 1950, p. 560.

21.Chr. EHRENFELS: *Über Fühlen und Wollen*. Wien, 1887, p. 75.

22.See: Hua XXVIII, p. 107.

23.*Ivi*, p. 115.

modalities of judgments, such as for example those of assertions or questions and so on. There are a great number of *apriori* rational expressions for will and logical reason of everyone. They represent all the possible cases that the will and the logical reason has to exist in the relative “man-world” context: the absolute rationality of these two remains the same as though they realize themselves in a human and relative context.

But these *apriori* and rational structures can work only with the support of a logical reason. The practical reason is not always parallel to the logical one, because it depends on this first.

(...) sind Wollungen wieder fundiert durch doxischen Thesen und zugleich durch Thesen der Sphäre der Wertungen. Fundierte Thesen haben nicht nur Richtigkeit überhaupt und in dem Sinn, daß sie ihre doxische, axiologische, praktische Wahrheit bzw. Unwahrheit habe, sondern sie ‘richten’ sich auch nach ihren Fundament-Thesen.²⁴

Following Husserl: it is necessary the help of the logical reason, to make possible an act of will. Indeed, it is necessary to know something, in order to refer to something. Consequently it is necessary to have a representation of an object, in order to will it. The reason of willing is strictly linked up to the reason of thinking, because we cannot do anything if we do not know the things toward which we act.

Dabei setzt jeder Wille nicht nur überhaupt Vorstellung des Gewollten voraus, sondern er hat notwendig eine umfassende Vorstellungsunterlage und (...) das Gewollte auch eine Glaubensunterlage bezogen auf reales Sein.²⁵

When we want something, we have to represent and know our object. The will depends necessarily on the logical reason both for the expression of its intentions and for its realization. In this set the definition of will is in harmony with that used in the first and second edition of *Logische Untersuchungen*.²⁶ Here in fact, Husserl wrote that there is not a parallelism between logical and practical reason, because the second depends on the first in its pure and rational activity. This is not completely an intentional kind of reason²⁷, because its acts are not objectivating acts able to represent its object. It refers to its objects usually in an impulsive or instinctive way.²⁸

The realization of will is, in fact, reliant on the logical reason and on its predicative

24. *Ivi*, p. 127

25. *Ivi*, p. 109.

26. Hua XIX, p. 382.

27. Hua XIX, p. 367.

28. Hua XXVII, p. 63.

or representative “voice”.²⁹ Without the representations of predicative reason, the will could not represent the objects of its volitions to itself. Thus the reason of pure consciousness is just a logical reason. The practical reason is just a psychological reason that can be purely rational only with the “objectivating” help of the logical reason. In this set Husserl can conceive the logical science still as a *Wissenschaftslehre* that does not leave any possibility for a parallelism and consequently for the realization of the ethical project.

Yet, after 1914 the definition of will develops a more autonomous feature. Maybe this is due to the ambition of Husserl of being “an Aristotle of pure ethics”. After those years, the will becomes more independent and important in regard to the functioning of every form of reason. Husserl seems to discover in it some elements essential for the realization of logical acts. We think that through the help of genetic method is put in evidence the relation between the passive and active life of reason. At the basis of active life of logical reason there is, in fact, the passive and active life of will. Therefore the practical reason seems to be not only the fundament of the practical acts but also of the logical acts.

3. THE DEFINITION OF WILL IN 1920

According to the Husserlian thought there are two phenomenological methods that can be helpful to the scientific research: static and genetic method.³⁰ These two methods are different each other. Static phenomenology consists in a certain way, in a descriptive phenomenology, that has to go through the essential contents of the consciousness. Genetics phenomenology is a form of explicative phenomenology which clarifies the genesis of the objects following their constitutive laws.³¹

Husserl puts near to the previous static or descriptive phenomenology a genetic phenomenology. While the first has the task to describe the pure reason of consciousness as it is, the second has the aim of explaining the development of rational process. Genetic phenomenology has, in substance, the purpose of making clear the reality according to its fieri, following the typical phenomenological movement to go back *zu den Sachen selbst*.

The description of will, elaborated by Husserl after the introduction of genetic method, maintains a link with what had been conceived in the previous works and

29. *Ivi*, p. 69.

30. As it concerns the exact date of the introduction of genetic phenomenology, we could say that it is difficult to find a specific moment. We can say that the signs of evolution of method are visible since 1913 in the modified use of term *genesis* in the third note of *Logische Untersuchungen* (1913), or, in a more evident way, in the method of enquiry used in *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis* (1913-20 / 1918-26).

31. HUSSERL, E.: *Metodo fenomenologico statico e genetico* (1921), tr. it. Milano Vergani: Il Saggiatore, 2003, p. 57.

at the same time it introduces new important elements. As it was in the lectures of 1914, “Der Wille ist kein bloßes Begehren; er gehört in die allgemeiner Sphäre der reinen Aktivität”.³² But, differently from 1914, it cannot be considered just as a practical act. It has not need for the act of representation of logical reason to exist and to comply itself from a phenomenological or a pure point of view.

*Der Begriff “Wille“ ist manchmal so weit genommen worden, dass jede Ichaktivität, also jedes tätige Vorstellen, Fühlen usw. darunter befasst wurde, also Aufmerksamkeit als Willensbetätigung gefasst wurde.*³³

Commonly, the will can be posed at the same stage of every form of activity of ego. It can be even confused with the practical act of representation that, as we saw before, belongs to the realm of logical reason. But the concept of will has not to be extended on every form of activity of consciousness because, namely, it is at the basis of every rational activity. It is not within the rational activity, but it is its first step. Following Husserlian analysis, the will is the constitutive part of every kind of rational and irrational act.

This is due to the key concept of attention (*Aufmerksamkeit*). The attention is not the result of will but it is rather its motor. The attention is that form of tension which let the *dynamis* of act become a real act. It let the will be *dynamis* of the action, because it is thanks to the attention that the will can receive the elements of reality and decide to do something in a certain way. While in the second edition of *Logische Untersuchungen*, attention was not a function of practical reason and it was not properly a pure component of act because it was just a part of the complex acts.³⁴ Here it is considered as an important part of the practical act and it is the essential key of the practical connection between subject and world.

Husserl stresses that the concept of will was considered in a “so large way” that any reference to the attention was put aside. On the contrary, every act of will is distinguished from the others acts thanks to the attention and to the particular kind of activity it gives rise to.

Der prägnante und eigentliche Begriff von Willen bezeichnet aber nur eine besondere sich verbreitet, sofern alle Aktivität in Form willkürlicher Aktivität auftreten kann.³⁵

The will continues to be a specific aspect of rational activity of consciousness, not only as its modalization, but above all as its requirement. It is a particular activity which involves aware and discretionary acts of pure reason of ego.

32. Hua XXXI, p. 10.

33. *Ibidem*.

34. See: Hua XIX, V LU, § 19.

35. Hua XXXI, p. 10.

Es will mir immermehr scheinen, dass Wille nicht eine eigene Weise des Bewusstseins ist, sondern eine besondere und höhere Form der Aktivität, die unter gewissen Wesensbedingungen, die in vorausgesetzten Objektivierungen und Fühlungen liegen, überall auftreten kann.³⁶

The will represents a “particular and superior” aspect of rational activity of consciousness and it can “come into play” under certain conditions. These conditions coincide with those of 1914, namely with those representations of objects that the acts have to assume for acting. But differently from 1914, these rational logical conditions are not here the necessary presuppositions of the existence of willing. On the contrary, the activity of will is considered as a particular and superior kind of rational action. The clarification of the sense of this *particularity* and *superiority* in the activity of consciousness is possible through the analysis of the key concept of attention. In fact, it is a specific component of will which makes the will active and superior respect to the other forms of activity of reason.

According to the results of genetic phenomenological analysis the activity of will is possible because of the attention. The attention is a *positive* (from Greek **ΠΟΙΕΩ**: an act of creation from something of already existent) feeling, or better it is an act that *makes* the interest something of real. This feeling transforms a simple act of perception in interest just because it puts in the perception the tension to be in the things we perceive. The interest then, thanks to its specific *tension* aimed “ad” or to an aim, changes into an act of will. As it was in the psychology of James, the tension of attention can be at a first stage an instrument for the interest and at a second stage an instrument for the will. It can transform the perception in interest and the interest in will. It adds, in fact, to the interest “the tension” which unifies the ego to the object of perception and the will to its productive characteristic (its capability to modify the reality and to produce new reality through its intention specifically aimed). Thanks to this double form of attention (passive tension and ad-tension) the simple act of perception becomes an act of interest or active will.

Consequently we could say that the will is composed both by attention and interest. These two components are linked each others and are articulated in two essential stages: passive and active. Both attention and interest can work on the two stages. Only in the active stage the activity of interest and attention give rise to the acts of will. Differently from the lectures of 1914 the act of will does not require the representations of logical reason to be effective. On the contrary, as Husserl wrote in his manuscript, “the reason is always a practical reason and it is servant of will”.³⁷ The will is independent from any kind of logical reason because

³⁶. *Ibidem*.

³⁷. E. Husserl, Ms. E III, 7, 85.

its components do not need any kind of activity. The will is itself a primitive form of action and it is disclosed through the genetic analysis. The link between interesting and perception is the first step of any form of knowledge. The will is “*superior and particular*” because it is at the basis of all kinds of acts, the logical acts too. Indeed, it is necessary the passive interest of perception and the active interest of knowing, to know any object.³⁸

This first step is not a real form of knowledge but a “will to know”. The true knowledge consists in the productive action of the ego. The logical reason can be really directed to the knowledge only if the will realizes itself in the will of doing.

The will, then, is a *particular* and *superior* faculty with respect to the other kinds of reason because it is the first and unavoidable stage of epistemological interaction between man and the world. It is not simply a form of parallel reason to the logical reason, but it is the first layer of logical activities. As Nam-In Lee wrote, every intentionality should be regarded as a practical intentionality.³⁹ Because every act of consciousness is always a practical act. The interior components of will (interest and attention) are the proofs of its primacy in the process of knowledge. We need to have or perceive an object, in order to know or to think it: this is the first and unavoidable step of the relation with the world. This is the first kind of interaction with the world. The ground of *doxa* is possible thanks to the practical acting of the ego. The aware of the world in the way of the *doxa* is possible through the passive background generated by will.

As Hart remarked just the will can put in light all the contents of the other kinds of reason.⁴⁰ The theoretical reason does not understand its representations if it does not reflect on them. And the act of reflection is the result of the *fiat* of will. As Husserl wrote “every act is an act of will”.⁴¹ Every kind of reason is firstly a practical reason because only through an action of will we can have an activity of reason. The will is the function that is in charge of every kind of activity.⁴² It is that particular and superior *dynamis* that can transform the *dynamis* self in act, in the act of judgment too.

The predicative activity of logical reason is still necessary to give voice to the reality we know, but differently from 1914 the process of communication between consciousness and the world is not due to logical reason but to the reason of will.

38. See: HUSSERL, E.: *Erfahrung und Urteil Untersuchungen zur Genalogie der Logik*, Hrsg. Von L. Landgrebe. Hamburg: Claassen & Goverts, 1948, §47.

39. LEE, N.: “Practical Intentionality and Transcendental Phenomenology as a Practical Philosophy”, *Husserl Studies*, 17, num. 1 (2000), pp. 49-63.

40. HART, J.: “Person and Common Life”, in *Phaenomenologica* 126, Dordrecht/ Boston/ London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

41. HUSSERL, E.: *Ms A V*, 22, 5.

42. See: *Ivi*, §78.

Even if the role of logical reason is always essential to make possible the expression of what we know, it is the reason of will that gives the point of starting to the logical reason for its activity.

Thus the parallelism between logical and practical reason not is still asymmetrical because every kind of reason is always a practical reason and, consequently, every kind of science is always a practical science that has its rational root in the life of will and in its *Lebenswelt*. The project of a scientific foundation of ethics and the introduction of genetic method led Husserl to modify his definition of practical reason. Thus in the work of *Krisis* the practical reason is the main subject of our knowledge and this reason has the duty of giving sense in skeptic deluge of our knowledge. We think that the difference between the description of reason, namely of logical and practical reason, over these years is affected by the ethical researches and the introduction of the genetic method.

CONCLUSION

We could conclude that genetic method and the ethical project affect the husserlian definition of rationality. There is a modification of meaning of reason from 1914 to 1930. In this period the practical reason becomes a more and more important form of reason. If following the model of *Logische Untersuchungen*, the practical reason was not a pure reason of consciousness and it depended on the representations of logical reason to comply their acts, after genetic and ethical studies it becomes the first component of every rational act. The will becomes a form of “superior and particular” reason because, as Husserl says, “every reason is a practical reason”. Interest and attention have been described, as components of will, and as a necessary layer for every activity of reason. Every form of reason, in fact, expresses itself through activity and the activity is moved just by the components of will. The will is not “any kind of activity” but it is the first layer of any activity. Thus, a logical act is not only a logical act but it is an unit of activity of willing and thinking.