Vol. 20 No. 2 (2021): Revista Filosofía UIS
Articles

Rule of Recognition and Minimum Contents of Natural Law in Hart: in Pursuit of an Articulation

Ubaldina Díaz Romero
Researcher at the INVIUS group and the ALEPH Foundation, Colombia

Published 2021-06-11

Keywords

  • conventional rule,
  • validity,
  • legal norm,
  • legal minimums,
  • constitutive convention,
  • legitimate authority
  • ...More
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How to Cite

Díaz Romero, U. (2021). Rule of Recognition and Minimum Contents of Natural Law in Hart: in Pursuit of an Articulation. Revista Filosofía UIS, 20(2), 119–139. https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v20n2-2021006

Abstract

In this article I propose a connection between Hart’s rule of reconigtion and the thesis of minimum contents of natural law of the same author. The recognition rule is understood as a conventional rule constituted by the practice of judicial officials in charge of applying validity criteria to determine whether particular norms belong to the system. The minimum contents of natural law constitute the basis of human tendencies or instincts. in his quest for survival. From the approaches of Marmor and Raz, it is proposed that in the recognition rule the minimum contents of natural law constitute the first filter for evaluating the validity of the particular legal norms subject to legal recognition, which provides solidity and significant consistency to the thesis of discretion and separability of the Hartian theory.

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