Articles
The “Unboundedness of the Conceptual” and Singular Thoughts in McDowell
Published 2021-06-11
Keywords
- conceptual,
- intentionality,
- limits,
- singular,
- thoughts
How to Cite
Saharrea, J. M. (2021). The “Unboundedness of the Conceptual” and Singular Thoughts in McDowell. Revista Filosofía UIS, 20(2), 141–164. https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v20n2-2021007
Copyright (c) 2021 Revista Filosofía UIS
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Abstract
Our purpose in this paper is to reconstruct the proposal on “de re thoughts” or singular thoughts that John McDowell develops. Our strategy is to address this reconstruction on the basis of “the unboundedness of the conceptual” thesis explained in his most recent production. The contrast between some aspects in Mind and World (1994) and previous articles dedicated to the singular thought gives a concrete explanatory value to the thesis that claims that the conceptual is unbounded.
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