Revista Filosofía UIS

Vol. 22 No. 1 (2023): January - June
Articles

Internal Realism and Semantic Externalism: «Twin Earth» and «The Brain in The Vat» Arguments

PDF (Español (España))
  • Luis Francisco Estrada Pérez
Luis Francisco Estrada Pérez
Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos
Bio
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v22n1-2023005

Published 2023-01-02

Keywords

  • external realism,
  • semantic externalism,
  • self-ascriptive statements,
  • uses of language,
  • twin earth,
  • brain in a vat
    • ...More
    Less

How to Cite

Estrada Pérez, L. F. (2023). Internal Realism and Semantic Externalism: «Twin Earth» and «The Brain in The Vat» Arguments. Revista Filosofía UIS, 22(1), 93–115. https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v22n1-2023005

Copyright (c) 2023 Revista Filosofía UIS

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Abstract

This article aims to analyze two doctrines that remain intertwined in Hilary Putnam's philosophy, namely, internal realism and semantic externalism in light of two presuppositions of the “Twin Earth” and "Brains in a vat” arguments: self-ascriptive statements and the use of language. It affirms that satisfactory adoption of both positions in Putnam´s program is evidenced and that an exhaustive analysis allows a more precise weighting of the author's scope and approaches. The conclusion reached is that, although there is compatibility between semantic externalism and internal realism in both arguments, however, the ontological and epistemic status of the representational language of those who are in the hypothetical state of those kind of puzzles is ambiguous.

PDF (Español (España))

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

  1. Anderson, D. L. (1992). What is Realistic about Putnam´s Internal Realism? Philosophical Topics, 20(1), 49-83. www.jstor.org/stable/43154639
  2. Button, T. (2013). The Limits of Realism. Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.001.0001
  3. Dancy, J. (1993). Introducción a la Epistemología Contemporánea. Tecnos.
  4. Davidson, D. (2003). Subjetivo, Intersubjetivo, Objetivo. Cátedra.
  5. Ebbs, G. (1992). Realism and Rational Inquiry. Philosophical Topics, 20(1), 1-33. www.jstor.org/stable/43154637
  6. Folina, J. (2016). Realism, Skepticism and the Brain in the Vat. En S. Goldberg, (Ed.), The Brain in the Vat (pp. 155-173). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107706965
  7. Forrai, G. (2001). Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes: A Defense of Internal Realism. Kluwer Academic Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2868-3
  8. Furmeton, R. (2003). Introspection and Internalism. En S. Nuccetelli (Ed.), New essays on semantic externalism and self- knowledge (pp 257- 276). MIT Press.
  9. Gardiner, M. (2000). Semantics Challenges to Realism: Dummett and Putnam. University of Toronto Press. https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442679740
  10. Goldberg, S. (Ed.). (2007). Internalism and Externalism in semantics and epistemology. Oxford University Press.
  11. Kallestrup, J. (2011). Semantic Externalism. Routledge Press. www.routledge.com/books/details/9780203830024/
  12. Kripke, S. (1995). El nombrar y la necesidad. UNAM.
  13. Moran, D. (2000). Hilary Putnam and Inmanuel Kant: Two “Internal Realist”? Synthese, 123(1), 65-104. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005273927958
  14. Nuccetelli, S. (Ed.) (2003). New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
  15. Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge University Press. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100056333
  16. Platón (1988a). Diálogos IV. La República. Editorial Gredos.
  17. Platón (1988b). Diálogos V. Parménides, Teeteto, Sofista, Político. Editorial Gredos.
  18. Putnam, H. (1973). Explanation and reference. En G. Pearce y P. Maynard (Comps.), Conceptual Change (pp. 199- 221). Reidel.
  19. Putnam, H. (1975). Mathematics, Matter, and Method. Philosophical Papers. (Vol. 1). Cambridge University Press.
  20. Putnam, H. (1979). Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625251
  21. Putnam, H. (1983). Realism and Reason, Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press.
  22. Putnam, H. (1984). El significado de «significado». (J. Acero, trad.). Teorema, 14(3-4), 345- 405.
  23. Putnam, H. (1987). The many faces of realism. Open court.
  24. Putnam, H. (1988). Razón, verdad e historia. Tecnos.
  25. Putnam, H. (1991a). El significado y las ciencias morales. UNAM.
  26. Putnam, H. (1991b). Realismo y razón. En El significado y las ciencias morales. (A. Stellino, trad.). (pp. 139- 158). UNAM.
  27. Putnam, H. (1992). Replies. Philosophical Topics, 20(1), 347-408.
  28. Putnam, H. (2000). Representación y realidad. Un balance crítico del funcionalismo. Gedisa.
  29. Putnam, H. (2013). Ética sin ontología. Alpha Decay.
  30. Putnam, H. (2016). Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity. Harvard University Press.