From the analogy of other to infinite responsibility, between Edmund Husserl and Emanuel Levinas

Abstract

This research is circumscribed within the thematic field of Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. And its objective is to try to elucidate within the same immanence of the transcendental experience of I think, the way not only in which intersubjectivity arises, but also how this last concept, like that of egology, is based on a notion of modern subjectivity that, on the one hand, appears within phenomenological architecture, as a constituent of meaning within Husserlian meditation, and on the other, it can appear as a notion that prevents the elaboration of a new concept of man that includes otherness within it, as Emmanuel Lévinas thinks, and with it, the possibility of speaking of a separate self that does not find in the other a mere analogy of its own, or an extension of its own immanence, but rather, the possibility of finding in that other that comes our way, the condition by which one can speak of time, of the world and of existence as a relationship with others and for others.