Wittgenstein vs. Russell in the Blue Book. Deconstructing the causal theory of meaning

Abstract

This article assesses the scope of Wittgenstein’s Blue Book as a systematic critique against what has been called a "causal theory" of meaning, specifically the one formulated by Russell in The Analysis of Mind. Such evaluation proceeds, first, by clarifying the way in which the causal conception leads to understand meaning as the appropriate conduct according to the occurrence of psychological causal laws. Secondly, it develops Wittgenstein’s Blue Book critique against  Russell’s conception in three steps: 1) the critique to the image hypothesis; 2) the rejection of the existence of  an internal and hidden process; 3) the abandonment of a psychological notion of understanding to explain the concept of meaning. Finally, it will be clarified how this criticism aims to weaken the claim of explaining the concept of meaning scientifically, a claim that underlies the causal conception.