Intuition and perception in the sixth Logical Investigation of Edmund Husserl
Published 2010-07-27
Keywords
- Consciousness,
- perception,
- intuition,
- intentionality,
- presentification
- apprehension,
- Objectifying acts,
- phenomenology ...More
How to Cite
Copyright (c) 2010 Susi Ferrarello
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Abstract
In this paper I would like to focus on the phenomenological definition of perception and on its relationship with intuition. Insofar these two ideas seem to play a pivotal role in the process of knowledge, we wonder if intuition has its own property or if it is a part of perception. In short we would like to understand if there is an actual difference between intuition and perception and how they work. As for the philosophical and bibliographical references, we will cite mostly the sixth Logical Investigation of Edmund Husserl. In this place Husserl sketches out Anschauung (intuition) and Wahrnehmung (perception) as two (different?) kinds of seeing and collecting reality. Both are aimed to the understanding of reality. Nevertheless, intuition seems to be posed on an higher stage than perception, since it seems to translate its Reinheit in the perceived datum.
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References
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