From Dasein to argumentation. Apel's continuation of hermeneutics of facticity

Abstract

In the present paper I argue that the philosophy of Karl-Otto Apel can be seen as a continuation of the Hermeneutics of facticity, which was initially proposed by Heidegger in the 1920s. In the first section I put forward an interpretation of that Hermeneutics, stressing its requirement of self-reflexivity; I then expound the Heideggerian notion of understanding and of "hermeneutic circle"; and I finally argue that this Hermeneutics keeps up with central aspects of the transcendental philosophy. In the second section I discuss the way in which Apel continues Heidegger´s Hermeneutics. First of all, I sustain that the main features of the Dasein are still present in the language game of argumentation; I then discuss the Apelian thesis that transcendental philosophy always begins with a factum; and I finally deal with other aspects of the general thesis here defended.