Revista Filosofía UIS

Vol. 23 No. 2 (2024): July - December
Articles

Taking Akrasia Seriously

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  • Verónica Rodríguez Blanco,
  • Andrés Botero-Bernal
Verónica Rodríguez Blanco
University of Surrey, United Kingdom
Andrés Botero-Bernal
Universidad Industrial de Santander, Colombia
Bio
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v23n2-2024008

Published 2024-07-27

Keywords

  • Akrasia,
  • practical reason,
  • negligent act,
  • compulsive act,
  • Aristotle,
  • responsibility judgments
    • ...More
    Less

How to Cite

Rodríguez Blanco, V., & Botero-Bernal, A. (2024). Taking Akrasia Seriously. Revista Filosofía UIS, 23(2), 53–76. https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v23n2-2024008

Copyright (c) 2024 Revista Filosofía UIS

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Abstract

This paper aims to lay the foundations for showing that akrasia is the key framework that underlies legal and ethical underlies legal and ethical responsibility for negligent acts. The study compares classical and modern conceptions of akrasia to shed light on the phenomena. It is suggested that we act inadvertently because we act akratically; this means that character and thought are not integrated, which prevents us from adopting a deliberative-aspirational viewpoint.

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