Vol. 14 No. 2 (2015): Revista Filosofía UIS
Research Article

The scopes of logical pluralism

Omar Vásquez Dávila
Universidad de Buenos Aires
Bio

Published 2015-12-03

Keywords

  • Logical pluralism,
  • logical consequence,
  • relativism,
  • monism

How to Cite

Vásquez Dávila, O. (2015). The scopes of logical pluralism. Revista Filosofía UIS, 14(2), 69–81. https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v14n2-2015003

Abstract

According to logical pluralism there is not one true logic, there are many. The most well-known pluralism is the view defended by J.C. Beall and Greg Restall. They are pluralists about logical consequence. In this paper, I adhere to the logical pluralism but I hold that the Beall-Restall pluralism has many unsolved problems. I will show that there are important reasons to search for another kind of pluralism.

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References

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