Non demonstrable principles and knowledge in Aristotle

Abstract

In this paper I examine Aristotle's view on the relative knowability of complexes and their elements. By analyzing Chapter B 19 of Posterior Analytics, I explain the difference between understanding simpliciter that involves the necessary knowledge of the cause or explanation of a phenomenon and comprehension through demonstration that relies on true, primary, immediate, best known and previous premises that can explain conclusions. In short, I show how, according to Aristotle, in order to have total comprehension we need to know, not only that something is the case but also why is the case. On the other hand, I challenge a very popular idea in the literature, according to which, some Platonic theses reappear almost verbatim in Aristotle's work. In particular, I argue that Aristotle's solution to the problem of the knowability of complexes and their elements in B 19 does not represent the continuity of Plato's thesis in the Theaetetus.