The Scientific Realism and the Pessimistic Induction: an open debate
Damián Islas Mondragón
Published 2019-05-13
Keywords
- Pessimistic Induction,
- Scientific Realism,
- Empirical Success,
- Unconceived Alternatives
How to Cite
Copyright (c) 2019 Revista Filosofía UIS
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Abstract
The debate between the defenders of certain versions of Scientific Realism and the authors who argue in favor of the pessimistic induction, remains open. This study was made with the objective of showing that the pessimistic induction represents a serious challenge for these versions of Scientific Realism. In the first part of the text I will review some of the different ways to characterize the pessimistic induction, emphasizing the type of realistic commitment with which they argue, that is, whether it is of a semantic, epistemic or metaphysical nature. In the second part I analyze three strategies that have been developed to undermine the pessimistic induction, as well as the counter arguments formulated by the defenders of the pessimistic induction before these attacks. I show that none of these three strategies achieves its objective. I conclude by suggesting a possible line of research on the subject.
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