Revista Filosofía UIS

Vol. 24 No. 2 (2025): July - December
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Translation. The Autonomy Challenge: Examining the Pre-emption Thesis in Judicial Reasoning and Precedent

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  • Sandra Gómora-Juárez,
  • Mariana Esparza Castilla,
  • Lucía Corzas Corona
Sandra Gómora-Juárez
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México
Mariana Esparza Castilla
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México
Lucía Corzas Corona
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v24n2-2025014

Published 2025-03-29

Keywords

  • precedent,
  • authority,
  • judicial reasoning,
  • pre-emption thesis,
  • autonomy thesis,
  • practical reasoning,
  • exclusionary reasons
    • ...More
    Less

How to Cite

Gómora-Juárez, S. ., Esparza Castilla, M., & Corzas Corona, L. . (2025). Translation. The Autonomy Challenge: Examining the Pre-emption Thesis in Judicial Reasoning and Precedent. Revista Filosofía UIS, 24(2), 289–316. https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v24n2-2025014

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Abstract

This article reflects on one of the challenges Gerald Postema’s account of the autonomy thesis poses to Raz’s pre-emption thesis in judicial practice and precedent. Certain flaws in the pre-emption thesis, as applied to courts, come to light upon analyzing the autonomy challenge, whereas some aspects of the former are better understood from the perspective of the latter. This work shows that, although these two theses seem to clash, the autonomy challenge leads instead to an alternative approach to the pre-emption thesis that allows exploring some disregarded relationships between judicial practical reasoning and precedent. Drawing from this Raz-Postema debate, I argue for an alternative reading of the autonomy challenge by introducing the hermeneutic strategy of courts (HeSCo) as a tool to analyze the role of officials as addressees of exclusionary legal directives and its explanatory force. The HeSCo ultimately unravels the paradox by holding the pre-emption thesis as central to the proper understanding of judicial practice and precedent.

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