Published 2009-07-07
Keywords
- fictional terms,
- vague terms,
- ontological commitment,
- Kripke
How to Cite
Copyright (c) 2009 Omar Hildebrando Vásquez
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Abstract
In this paper, I adhere to the theory of direct reference of meaning. I hold that the meaning of a name is its bearer and that this bearer is not necessarily a spacio-temporal entity. I will argue that meaning of a vague term is inevitably binded to its roots, and that this takes us to a classification of two kinds of vague terms: vague terms "of belief" and "of human activities". From this, I will show that the sentences that contain these terms do not lack of truth value. I will differentiate this proposal from the analysis made by Saul Kripke in respect to fictional terms. I will conclude arguing that the ontological commitment arising from this account is much favorable the ones assumed by other theories.
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References
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