Revista Filosofía UIS

Vol. 21 No. 1 (2022): January - June
Articles

Possibilities of a Physicalist Interpretation of Consciousness. Some Clarifying Ideas

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  • Diego Llontop Céspedes
Diego Llontop Céspedes
Universidad de Lima, Perú
Bio
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v21n1-2022006

Published 2022-01-03

Keywords

  • consciousness,
  • reduction-elimination,
  • first-third person,
  • ontology-epistemology,
  • common sense,
  • neuroscience
    • ...More
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How to Cite

Llontop Céspedes, D. (2022). Possibilities of a Physicalist Interpretation of Consciousness. Some Clarifying Ideas. Revista Filosofía UIS, 21(1), 103–128. https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v21n1-2022006

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Creative Commons License

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Abstract

in this text we evaluate the conceptual possibilities of a physicalist interpretation of consciousness. To this end, representative physicalist positions in the field of philosophy as well as recent neuroscientific research are taken into account. Both lines of research involve questioning common sense approaches to the issue of consciousness. However, they do not imply a complete elimination of what this approach can represent. In this sense, an epistemological interpretation of the first person perspective is presented in relation with a third person, scientific perspective.

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