Revista Filosofía UIS

Vol. 21 No. 2 (2022): July - December
Articles

Approach to Constitutivism: Objective and Structure of the Constitutivist Foundation of Moral Norms

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  • Cristian Andrés Zapata Vélez
Cristian Andrés Zapata Vélez
Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v21n2-2022005

Published 2022-07-01

Keywords

  • Constitutivism,
  • constitutivist principles,
  • agency,
  • action,
  • constructivism,
  • moral norms
    • ...More
    Less

How to Cite

Zapata Vélez, C. A. (2022). Approach to Constitutivism: Objective and Structure of the Constitutivist Foundation of Moral Norms. Revista Filosofía UIS, 21(2), 101–124. https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v21n2-2022005

Copyright (c) 2022 Revista Filosofía UIS

Creative Commons License

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Abstract

This work seeks to reconstruct the structure of constitutivism to facilitate its dissemination in the Spanish language. To achieve this, it starts from an analysis of the formulation of the general objective of the constitutivist strategy. Then, it traces its historical origins in the problems of the sources of normativity, constructivism, and the normativity of reasons. Later, there is an explanation about the simple constitutivist movement and, finally, the article closes by presenting the three main theses that support any constitutivist strategy.

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