REVISTA FILOSOFIA UIS

v. 21 n. 2 (2022): julio - diciembre
Artigos

Aproximación al constitutivismo: objetivo y estructura de la fundamentación constitutivista de las normas morales

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  • Cristian Andrés Zapata Vélez
Cristian Andrés Zapata Vélez
Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios
Biografia
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v21n2-2022005

Publicado 2022-07-01

Palavras-chave

  • Constitutivismo,
  • principios constitutivos,
  • agencia,
  • acción,
  • constructivismo,
  • normas morales
    • ...Mais
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Como Citar

Zapata Vélez, C. A. (2022). Aproximación al constitutivismo: objetivo y estructura de la fundamentación constitutivista de las normas morales. REVISTA FILOSOFIA UIS, 21(2), 101–124. https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v21n2-2022005

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Resumo

Este trabajo busca reconstruir la estructura del constitutivismo para facilitar su difusión en lengua española. Para lograrlo, parte de un análisis de la formulación del objetivo general de la estrategia constitutivista, para luego rastrear sus orígenes históricos en los problemas de las fuentes de la normatividad, el constructivismo y la normatividad de las razones, posteriormente se explica el movimiento simple constitutivista y se cierra el artículo presentando las tres tesis principales que sostiene toda estrategia constitutivista.

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