The Epistemic Infeasibility of Immodest Conceptual Analysis
Kenneth Einar Himma- Andrés Botero Bernal
Published 2024-01-02
Keywords
- Conceptual Jurisprudence,
- methodology,
- modest and immodest conceptual analysis,
- the nature of law
How to Cite
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Abstract
This essay argues that immodest conceptual analysis is epistemically infeasible for beings like us because we immodest claims about the nature of a kind cannot be justified by means that are either a priori or a posteriori. Immodest conceptual analysis is epistemically infeasible, then, because we have no reliable way to identify and justify immodest claims about the nature of a kind. The essay ends with an evaluation of Scott Shapiro’s and Mark Greenberg’s theories of law from the standpoint of a modest approach – i.e. from the standpoint of what our conceptual practices entail with respect to the nature of law.
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