Revista Filosofía UIS

Vol. 23 No. 2 (2024): July - December
Articles

A Comprehensive Taxonomy of Reasons

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  • Kenneth Einar Himma,
  • Kevin Valdivieso
Kenneth Einar Himma
Universidad de Zagreb, Croacia
Bio
Kevin Valdivieso
Universidad Industrial de Santander, Colombia
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v23n2-2024007

Published 2024-07-23

Keywords

  • Taxonomy,
  • kind of reasons,
  • theorical reasoning,
  • practical reasoning,
  • legal normativity

How to Cite

Himma, K. E., & Valdivieso, K. (2024). A Comprehensive Taxonomy of Reasons. Revista Filosofía UIS, 23(2), 29–52. https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v23n2-2024007

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Abstract

This essay attempts to provide a comprehensive account of the various kinds of reasons regarding theoretical and practical reasoning.  It distinguishes the following kinds of reason: (1) epistemic and practical reasons; (2) source-based and content-based reasons; (3) defeasible and conclusive reasons; (4) motivating, explanatory, and justifying reasons; (5) objective and subjective reasons; (6) first-order and second-order reasons; (7) inclusionary and exclusionary reasons; and (8) intrinsic and instrumental reasons.  These distinctions are then applied to the problem of explaining legal normativity.

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