Banal Evil and Conscience: A Reinterpretation from Hannah Arendt and Thomas Aquinas

Abstract

The thesis of this article is that banal evil refers to a deformed consciousness. Arendt's own works suggest such an understanding of banal evil. Although various authors have emphasized the importance of conscience in the formation of banal evil, none, as far as can be seen, has chosen to define it in this way. Nor, as far as is known, did Arendt. The German philosopher connects thinking and conscience. She understands the latter as a by-product of the former. Therefore, the other definition of banal evil, the one that links it to the inability to think, cannot be abandoned. Arendt privileges this definition and does not reject the other. However, thinking, as Arendt understands it, in its function of separating man from evil and judging the facts of experience, comes to resemble conscience, since the latter also has this task. Moreover, conscience functions in a dialogical way, just as Arendt suggests that thinking does. Arendt does not clarify how thinking leads man to the moral truth about his actions, nor how it can be distorted. Nor does she inquire deeply into conscience. All this has led her to be interpreted by St. Thomas, in whom can be found some key contributions to resolving some questions that Arendt left open about banal evil.