Revista Filosofía UIS

Vol. 15 No. 1 (2016): Revista Filosofía UIS
Research Article

Intentional attribution and rationality: A critical reading of Dennett’s Intentional Attribution Program

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  • Edgar Eslava
Edgar Eslava
Universidad Santo Tomás, Bogotá
Bio
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v15n1-2016011

Published 2016-06-24

Keywords

  • Rationality,
  • intentionality,
  • Dennett,
  • consciousness,
  • intentional attribution

How to Cite

Eslava, E. (2016). Intentional attribution and rationality: A critical reading of Dennett’s Intentional Attribution Program. Revista Filosofía UIS, 15(1), 225–243. https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v15n1-2016011

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Abstract

In this paper I introduce some of the key elements of Daniel Dennett’s theory of intentional attribution and their relation with his notion of rationality. While doing so I will show that Dennett’s approach implies a circularity in the process of attribution of rationality, and that his resource to evolutionary arguments for trying to avoid an infinite regress does not help him to avoid the problem. My presentation will include a revision of Dennett’s arguments for epistemic intentional ascription and rationality attribution as well as some criticisms developed against his proposal. At the end of the article I will extend the criticisms and present my view about his proposal for ideal rationality attribution.

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