Hume's revenge. A defense of the moral emotivism
Published 2017-09-11
Keywords
- Hume,
- moral emotivism,
- moral rationalism,
- neuroethics,
- positivism
How to Cite
Copyright (c) 2017 Revista Filosofía UIS
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Abstract
My porpose, in this paper, is to give a brief exposition of the Hume’s moral theory, and the positivist moral emotivism. I will present some of the strongest objections of both theories, which narrowly leave them out of combat. Finally, that the findings that give account of the functioning of the human moral nature, from a neuronal point of view, seem to fit the most basic presuppositions of both theories, without their compatibility being total. For this I will use an example: the murder of a subject and the subsequent statement of witnesses.
Downloads
References
Damasio, A. (2008). El error de Descartes. Madrid: Booket
Damasio, A. (2010). En busca de Spinoza. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Destino.
Hume, D. (2012). Tratado sobre la naturaleza humana. Madrid: Tecnos.
Kant, I. (1999). Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres. Madrid: Ariel.
Kant, I. (2005). Crítica de la razón práctica. México: FCE.
Korsgaard, C. (1986). Skepticism about Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophy, 83 (1), 5-25.
Mill, J.S. (2014). El utilitarismo. Madrid: Alianza.
Nagel, T. (1970). The Possibility of Altruism. Prince ton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Nichols, Sh. (2002). How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism, or Is it Irrational to Be Amoral? The monist, 2 (2), 285-303.
Piaget, J. (1966). The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages. New York: Free Press.
Rabossi, E. (1971). Emotivismo ético, positivismo lógico e irracionalismo. Diánoia, 17 (17); 36-61.
Singer, P. (1995). How Are We to Live? Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Stevenson, Ch. L. (2004). “El significado emotivo de los términos éticos”. El positivismo lógico. Bogotá: FCE.
Stevenson, Ch.L. (1984). Ética y lenguaje. Madrid: Paidos.
Tugendhat, E. (2001). Problemas. Madrid: Gedisa.
Von Wright, G.H. (2010). La diversidad de lo Bueno. Madrid: Marcial Pons.
Williams, B. (1981). “Internal and External Reasons,” En Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zavadivker, N. (2008). Alfred Ayer y la teoría emotivista de los enunciados morales. Anuario Filosófico, XLI (3), 661-685.