Published 2017-09-11
Keywords
- concepts,
- Dreyfus-McDowell debate,,
- expertise,
- practical concepts,
- theory of content
How to Cite
Copyright (c) 2017 Revista Filosofía UIS
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Abstract
In this text it will be analyzed if the notion of ‘concept’ is enough to explain the content of the experience and the guide of the activity of an expert when she/he is performing her/his skillful activity. The text will start analyzing two explicative models of expertise, the conceptualistic model of McDowell and the Phenomenological model of Dreyfus, trying to focus in how both models explain that expertise requires a presentation of the world and a guide to the activity that is sensible to the particularities of each concrete situation where expert action is performed. In this point, McDowell’s model proposes ‘practical concepts’ as its central notion. At the end, it will be introduced a proposal about how to understand the practical concepts and it will be offered an argument to show that such concepts are not enough to explain the content of the experience and the guide of the activity that an expert has.
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