Value and Valuation: A Discussion with Emotivism and Institutionalism
Published 2018-05-16
Keywords
- value,
- valuation,
- emotivism,
- cognitivism,
- institutionalism
How to Cite
Copyright (c) 2018 Revista Filosofía UIS
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Abstract
The purpose of this work is to take up a note that seems important to us from the great philosopher of logic, Bocheński. His note allows us to discuss with some contemporary philosophical schools, by placing us in the so-called cognitivism or moral objectivism. Based on that note, then, we discussed with Hume and Smith, whom we evaluate as emotivists, as well as with Searle and Ferber, whom we see in institutionalism. The work tries to highlight some points where there are convergences with moral objectivism, and discusses some others where we find important disagreements.
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References
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