Vol. 17 No. 1 (2018): Revista Filosofía UIS
Articles

Value and Valuation: A Discussion with Emotivism and Institutionalism

Jacob Buganza
Universidad Veracruzana

Published 2018-05-16

Keywords

  • value,
  • valuation,
  • emotivism,
  • cognitivism,
  • institutionalism

How to Cite

Buganza, J. (2018). Value and Valuation: A Discussion with Emotivism and Institutionalism. Revista Filosofía UIS, 17(1), 205–224. https://doi.org/10.18273/revfil.v17n1-2018010

Abstract

The purpose of this work is to take up a note that seems important to us from the great philosopher of logic, Bocheński. His note allows us to discuss with some contemporary philosophical schools, by placing us in the so-called cognitivism or moral objectivism. Based on that note, then, we discussed with Hume and Smith, whom we evaluate as emotivists, as well as with Searle and Ferber, whom we see in institutionalism. The work tries to highlight some points where there are convergences with moral objectivism, and discusses some others where we find important disagreements.

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References

Bocheński, J. M. (1992). Introducción al pensamiento filosófico. Barcelona: Herder.

Carrasco, M. (2009). De Hutcheson a Smith: un sentimentalismo sofisticado. Revista de filosofía, 65, 81-96.

Deleuze, G. (1996). Empirismo y subjetividad. Barcelona: Gedisa.

Ferber, R. (1995). Conceptos fundamentales de la filosofía. Barcelona: Herder.

Hume, D. (1998). Tratado de la naturaleza humana. Madrid: Tecnos.

Rosmini, A. (2010). Principios de la ciencia moral. México: Universidad Veracruzana y Plaza y Valdés.

Searle, J. (1969). Speech acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, A. (2004). Teoría de los sentimientos morales. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.