Vol. 13 No. 2 (2014): Revista UIS Ingenierías
Articles

Testing the possibility to manage cooperation in CO2 crisis through mechanisms to face the dependence of the initial condition of trust using a simulation model

Jorge Andrick Parra-Valencia
Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga
Bio
Isaac Dyner-Rezonzew
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Bio
María Cristina Serrano
Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga
Bio
Eliécer Pineda-Ballesteros
Universidad Nacional Abierta y a Distancia
Bio
Adriana Rocío Lizcano-Dallos
Universitaria de Investigación y Desarrollo
Bio

Published 2014-06-12

Keywords

  • Management of cooperation,
  • large-scale social dilemmas,
  • mechanisms,
  • trust,
  • dependence to initial conditions

How to Cite

Parra-Valencia, J. A., Dyner-Rezonzew, I., Serrano, M. C., Pineda-Ballesteros, E., & Lizcano-Dallos, A. R. (2014). Testing the possibility to manage cooperation in CO2 crisis through mechanisms to face the dependence of the initial condition of trust using a simulation model. Revista UIS Ingenierías, 13(2), 7–28. Retrieved from https://revistas.uis.edu.co/index.php/revistauisingenierias/article/view/7-28

Abstract

The mechanism of cooperation based on trust presents dependence to its initial conditions. We tested the possibility to promote and sustain cooperation through a combination of mechanisms using a simulation model in the CO2 crisis. Our results suggest cooperation can be promoted and sustained with our combination of mechanisms. The simulation experiments offer support to our hypothesis about the possibility to manage cooperation in large-scale social dilemmas even if the trust’s initial conditions are not enough to expect high levels of collective action.

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